"Un procès atypique s'est tenu, mercredi 8 février, devant le tribunal correctionnel de Paris, qui devait dire si la vente de sex toys à moins de 200 mètres d'une école viole ou non la loi française. Les magistrats de la 10e chambre doivent déterminer si les godemichés et autres vibromasseurs sont des objets érotiques, et autorisés, ou des objets "pornographiques", seuls interdits à proximité des "établissements d'enseignement".
La loi sur la protection de l'enfance de 1987, réformée en 2007, ne précise pas en effet ce qu'est précisément "un objet à caractère pornographique"." (http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/article/2012/02/08/ouverture-du-proces-des-sex-toys-devant-le-tribunal-correctionnel-de-paris_1640257_3224.html).
Cette affaire, comme beaucoup d'autres, illustre l'importance de l'absence de définition dans la loi. Le problème se pose avec une acuité particulière lorsque le terme en question est ouvert à plusieurs interprétations, ce qui est manifestement le cas de l'adjectif "pornographique".
Il existe à ce propos une abondante jurisprudence aux Etats-Unis sur le sens des mots "pornography" et "pornographic". Voir notamment l'affaire State v. Bahl, à l'occasion de laquelle la Cour suprême de l'Etat de Washington a notamment remarqué que : "Many courts have held that sentencing conditions that prohibit access to or possession of pornography are unconstitutionally vague. They have noted that the term “pornography,” unlike obscenity, has never been given a precise legal definition, at least insofar as adult pornography is concerned. E.g., Loy, 237 F.3d at 263 (“the term ‘pornography,’ unmoored from any particular statute, has never received a precise legal definition from the Supreme Court or any other federal court of appeals, and remains undefined in the federal code”). In Loy, the Third Circuit discussed a number of materials that might or might not be considered pornography, such as the book Lolita, Calvin Klein advertisements, and Yeats' poem “Leda and the Swan,” and concluded that although the propriety of calling any of these materials pornographic would generate debate, the debate would not be resolved. Id. at 264. The court said, “with regard to ‘pornography’ rather than ‘obscenity,’ we do not ‘know it when we see it.’ ”" (http://caselaw.findlaw.com/wa-supreme-court/1343551.html).
Il existe à ce propos une abondante jurisprudence aux Etats-Unis sur le sens des mots "pornography" et "pornographic". Voir notamment l'affaire State v. Bahl, à l'occasion de laquelle la Cour suprême de l'Etat de Washington a notamment remarqué que : "Many courts have held that sentencing conditions that prohibit access to or possession of pornography are unconstitutionally vague. They have noted that the term “pornography,” unlike obscenity, has never been given a precise legal definition, at least insofar as adult pornography is concerned. E.g., Loy, 237 F.3d at 263 (“the term ‘pornography,’ unmoored from any particular statute, has never received a precise legal definition from the Supreme Court or any other federal court of appeals, and remains undefined in the federal code”). In Loy, the Third Circuit discussed a number of materials that might or might not be considered pornography, such as the book Lolita, Calvin Klein advertisements, and Yeats' poem “Leda and the Swan,” and concluded that although the propriety of calling any of these materials pornographic would generate debate, the debate would not be resolved. Id. at 264. The court said, “with regard to ‘pornography’ rather than ‘obscenity,’ we do not ‘know it when we see it.’ ”" (http://caselaw.findlaw.com/wa-supreme-court/1343551.html).
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